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Name Calling On The Internet: The Problems Faced By Victims
Of Defamatory Content In Cyberspace.
SARUDZAI CHITSA∗

INTRODUCTION

The celebrated advent of the Internet has brought with it an exciting opportunity for the
worldwide audience to share information in a unique way. Internet users often hook into
electronic bulletin boards to post content on the Internet either for fun or to gather information
about a subject the user is writing about. However, lawmakers around the world are struggling to
tackle a problem which arises when an injurious false statement is made about a corporation or
an individual on these electronic bulletin boards. This problem is exasperated by the fact that at
the inception of the Internet, there were no laws that regulated Internet speech. 1 Countries have
reacted differently to resolve the problem of defamation on the Internet.2 The different legal

∗LL.M in Intellectual Property Law Candidate 2011, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Yeshiva University,
New York, New York.
1. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koeing, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L.. REV. 335,
366-7 (providing history of Internet tort law.)
2. See, Helen Chang, Singapore Wakes Up And Smells The Internet, Business Week Editions, March 25,
1996, at 30 (describing that in Singapore the government has extended libel laws covering print media to
make Internet service providers liable for content placed on their bulletin boards); Section 1 (1) of the
United Kingdom Defamation Act of 1996 (granting immunity to defamation suits to service providers for
statements originating from third parties as long as the service provider can show that he, she or it did not
know that what they are publishing is defamatory); U.S.C. § 230 (a) (giving immunity to libel suits to
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for defamatory content posted online by third parties even when the ISP
has been given notice of the defamatory content); Newzimbabwe.com, Zimbabwe Makes First Facebook
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approaches used in different countries have bought with them special legal challenges to those
injured by the content posted on the Internet.
In the past decade or so, internet libel has become one of the hot topics in internet law.
Courts have dealt with an enormous amount of cases brought by both the suppliers and
consumers of the internet services. Although the advent of the World Wide Web has come with
many complex legal problems; this paper will only focus on the problems that are being faced by
the victims of defamatory speech on the internet in trying to seek remedies through the courts.
These problems include, inter alia, the reluctance of the courts in unmasking the identities of the
authors of the defamatory speech where such speech is posted in blogs where the true identity of
the author is not known,3 jurisdiction, choice of law and enforcement.4

AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS
There are some crucial points that are worth emphasizing from the beginning. The
problems that victims of defamatory speech posted on the internet face are caused by the fact that
internet speech is often anonymous and many speakers on the internet employ pseudonymous
identities. The international connectivity of constantly communicating computers, their speedy
transmission of huge amounts of data and the Internet’s lack of respect for national borders has
caused problems more diverse than lawmakers and courts in any country could have ever
imagined.5 This has made it extremely easy for “unknown” persons with an Internet connection
Arrest, April 03 2011 (describing how the Zimbabwean government is reacting to content posted on the
Internet).
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See, In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America On Line, 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).

4

See, Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, (2002) HCA 56, 77 ALJR 255 (2002).
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See, generally, International Herald Tribune, A New Legal Chapter, In Verse, January 31, 2006.
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to bypass mainstream media and speak directly to thousands, if not millions, of people similarly
situated, and making the potential injury to one’s reputation almost immeasurable. It’s very easy
for a person in, say, China to post defamatory statements about an American citizen or
corporation via a computer situated in China – where (as discussed in detail below) the law of,
and defenses to, defamation in China may be very different or, in some cases, almost
nonexistent.6 Even if the identity of the author(s) is known, questions such as what country
should have jurisdiction to hear the suit for damages, which country’s law should be applied to
that suit and, if judgment is obtained, how it can be enforced if the author of the internet
defamatory speech is domiciled outside the jurisdiction of the court, have posed more difficult
questions than answers.
This unique nature of the internet makes it difficult for those libeled on it to pursue their
cases. Some have argued that there is nothing that changed with the advent of the internet
because many states in the U.S as well as many nations have long arm statutes that subject
authors of defamatory speech on the internet to their laws. In as much as this might be true, long
arm statutes have not been able to eradicate all the above mentioned problems. Even if a country
can apply its long arm statute and subject the defendant to its defamation laws, the plaintiff can
still have problems in trying to enforce the judgment in defendant’s country if it has different and
wide defenses that excuse the defendant’s speech.

THE CONFLICT OF LAWS NIGHTMARE

6

See, generally, Elizabeth Spahn, As Soft As Tofu: Consumer Product Defamation On The Chinese
Internet, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 865, 879 (2006) ( describing that unlike American libel law where
the defendant can use the defense of truth, in China comments posted on the internet about a natural
person can be found to be defamatory even if what the defendant wrote about the plaintiff is true).
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Those libeled on the Internet are placed in a very unique position in that any country that
had access to the defamatory content posted on the Internet will be a potential forum because as
long as the jurisdictional requirements of a country are met, the plaintiff can bring suit there.7 Of
course, in doing so, the plaintiff will look at the jurisdiction which is most favorable to the
plaintiff’s libel suit. It might be advisable for an Australian plaintiff who was defamed by, say,
an article in The Wall Street Journal to sue the defendant newspaper in Australia (as was the case
in Dow Jones and Co v. Gutnick 8 where the plaintiff sued The Wall Street Journal in Victoria,
Australia, for statements that it had published online that implied that he was a money launderer)
than to bring the suit in New Jersey (United States of America) because the plaintiff has slim
chances of winning the suit and/or being rewarded meaningful damages because, unlike in
Australia, freedom of speech in the United States enjoys broader constitutional protection and
United States courts are keen to protect the First Amendment right of speakers.9
But, even if jurisdiction is established and the court in a foreign country has concluded
that it can use its long arm to subject the defendant to its jurisdiction, the court hearing the suit
must decide the question of choice of law. Most common law countries still require the “double
actionability requirement”; that is, for an action for defamation to proceed, there must be a
successful cause of action in both the forum where the plaintiff has chosen to bring the suit and
the place where the defamatory statements originated. This problem is invidious where the
7

See, Jessica R. Friedman, A Lawyer’s Ramble Down The Information Superhighway: Defamation, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 794 at 803 (describing that defendants are potentially liable for suit in every jurisdiction
that had access to the defamatory content posted on the Internet).
8
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(2002) HCA 56, 77 ALJR 255.
See, generally, John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.D2d 451 (2005).
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parties come from two different legal systems which have totally different defamation laws. As
an example, if the Australian High Court had chosen to follow this route, the plaintiff in Dow
Jones and Co. v. Gutnick 10, might not have succeeded in suing The Wall Street Journal because
in the United States, the plaintiff, as a public figure, would have been required to prove that the
defendant published the statements with actual malice, that is, the defendant knew that the
statements were false.
In Dow Jones and Co. v. Gutnick, 11 the Australian High Court, faced with this question
of whether to apply Australian defamation law, as submitted by the plaintiff, or to apply libel law
of New Jersey as vigorously argued by The Wall Street Journal, decided not to follow the
“double actionability” rule in favor of a “proper law” approach. The Wall Street Journal’s
argument was premised on the fact that the Australian defamation law recognizes that there can
be jurisdiction either in the court where defendant is domiciled or in the place where the
defamatory statements were published. The question which immediately struck any lawyer is;
what constitutes a “place where the defamatory statements are published”? The Australian High
Court held that it can either be a place where the defamatory statements were made or where the
defamatory statements were made public and have an impact on the reputation of the plaintiff.
The Australian High Court agreed with the plaintiff that it was proper for a court in Victoria,
Australia, to hear the case because the Mr. Gutnick’s reputation was injured not only in New
Jersey, but also in Victoria, Australia, where he lived and had businesses. The court concluded
that it was proper for the plaintiff to bring the suit in Australia because Australian law allowed
him to sue in Australia since his reputation was also injured in Australia.
10

See, supra.

11

See, supra.
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Considering the different cultures from different countries and methods that countries use
to solve the problem of Internet libel, the “double actionability” requirement places a huge
burden on the victims whose reputations have been harmed by content posted on the Internet.
Internationally, courts should follow the “proper law” approach used by the Australian High
Court and allow the plaintiff to bring suit as long as the plaintiff’s reputation was injured in that
country and the plaintiff meets the jurisdictional requirements of that country.
It is critical to note that even in countries where such legitimate forum shopping is
allowed by national laws, the question that a victim of defamatory statement may be confronted
with is; can a plaintiff sue for damage caused by defamatory statements on the internet in every
jurisdiction where such statements were published? If so, should the plaintiff be allowed to sue
only in countries where he or it (in the case of legal persons) has reputation? If such reputation is
recognized almost internationally, for example where the plaintiff is an internationally
recognized celebrity or a multi-national company, should he or it be allowed to sue in each and
every jurisdiction since the internet is transnational? Or should suits be limited to countries
which share the same language used in the internet post? More precisely, where a defaming
online post originated in Chile and written in Spanish, should a company with international
reputation which has been defamed by the publication be allowed to sue only in Spanish
speaking countries? Although this question has not been answered by many countries, it seems
most nations will allow the celebrity or the internationally recognized company to seek damages
in respect of injury that the celebrity or the company has suffered in that jurisdiction.
The European Union (EU) approach to this problem might shade light on the solution to
this dilemma. In the EU, where a person, whether natural or legal, has been injured by material
that has been distributed in one or more members of the European Community, the plaintiff can
6

sue in the country where the defamatory content was published or in each member state the
defamatory material was distributed.12 Although the EU approach does not address a situation
where the defamatory material has been distributed internationally, it serves as a model solution
in solving the dilemma of which countries should accept the plaintiff’s suit. If the EU approach
is to be followed, then what the court should consider is not the language used in the defamatory
content, but whether the plaintiff’s reputation was injured in that jurisdiction.

ENFORCEMENT
Assuming that the plaintiff in an internet libel case wins against a defendant who lives
abroad, he may face challenges in enforcing the judgment because the judgment must be
recognized by the courts in defendant’s country for it to be enforceable there. The trend in the
past has seen many countries reluctant to enforce foreign judgments, either because they do not
have mechanisms that allow them to recognize foreign decrees or such judgments will be against
their own legal principles. It will be difficult for a plaintiff who wins a judgment against an
internet libel defendant who lives in the United States to enforce it in the United States because
of an over-riding constitutional preference for the First Amendment right of freedom of
expression. The American courts will not enforce a judgment which, on the face of it, will
suppress the defendant’s First Amendment right.
Considering the worldly nature of the Internet and the fact that no single country is
immune to the problem of anonymous bloggers who post defamatory content on the Internet, a

12

See, Shevill v. Presse Alliance [1995] 2 AC 218 (holding that a London based newspaper which was
published in Sweden could be sued for defamation under Swedish law or in any other European Union
state where the plaintiff has suffered harm to his reputation).
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uniform, international methodology in dealing with Internet defamation cases seem to be the
most favorable solution to the problem of reluctance by countries to enforce foreign judgments.

UNMASKING THE “UNKNOWN” BLOGGERS’ IDENTITY
One of the greatest challenges faced by the victims of internet defamatory statements is
that internet speech is usually anonymous. In the United States of America for example, 47
U.S.C. § 230 (a) gives immunity to providers of interactive computer services. The statute was
enacted by Congress in 1996 “to promote the development of the Internet and to provide
immunity to Internet Service Providers (ISPs)”13 It was enacted in response to Stratton Oakmont
Inc v. Prodigy Services ,14 which held the defendant liable for defamatory comments that were
posted on a discussion board it hosted. The Stratton Oakmont court held that facts of this case
were different from those in Cubby v. CompuServe, 15(holding that the defendant did not edit
statements that appeared on its website and therefore it was merely a distributor, and not a
publisher, of the defaming statements that were on its discussion board) because the defendant
had explicitly marketed itself as “a family oriented computer network” that screened the material
that appeared on its discussion board and therefore it was as good as the author of the defamatory
material himself.
It is now settled law in the United States that a victim of defamation on the
Internet cannot sue an interactive service provider even after the ISP has been given
notice of the offending content. The United Kingdom’s 1996 Defamation Act section 1
13

See, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b) (1) (incorporating the Congress’s policy in enacting the Communications
Decency Act).
14

15

1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995)
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
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(1) provides for immunity to ISPs as well for content posted on line by a third party, but
only if the ISP can show that it; “ (a) …was not the author, editor or publisher of the
statement complained of, (b) …took reasonable care in relation to its publication, and
(c)…did not know, and had no reason to believe, that what [it] did caused or contributed
to the publication of a defamatory statement.”16 A reading of section 1 (1) of UK
Defamation Act imply that the Act does not provide total immunity in that if an ISP
knows, or has reason to know, that what it caused to be published is defamatory it will
not be immune to suit.
47 U.S.C § 230 protects ISPs in a way foreign to other countries.17 In Zeran v.
America On Line Inc,18the American court have held that the rationale in the
Communications Decency Act is to preserve the freedom of expression on the internet
and not to overburden the ISPs by requiring them to investigate each and every claim to
determine if the content is not defamatory. American courts are afraid that if the ISPs can
be sued after being given notice of the defamatory content, the ISPs will simply remove
the content complained of even if it is not defamatory than to bear the costs of litigation
or investigation.19

16

See, Section 1 (1) of U.K’s Defamation Act of 1996

17

th

See, Zeran v. America On Line Inc, 129 F.3d 327 (4 Cir. 1997) (holding that allowing an ISP to be
liable for defamatory content if it has notice would defeat the purpose of the Communications Decency
Act (47 U.S.C § 230)
18

129 F.3d 327.

19

See, Zeran, 129 F.3d, at 333 (noting that if notice could be used to trigger litigation, the ISPs would
respond by removing the speech on the Internet, even if the speech is not defamatory).
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However, not every country shares the American view. Some jurisdictions have
argued that the American position serves the only interests of the ISPs than those who are
defamed by the comments posted on their bulletin boards. In China, ISPs are required by
the Ministry of Public Security to look for defamatory content posted on their electronic
bulletin boards. Once given notice, the ISP is required to remove the content. If the ISP
does not remove the defamatory speech from the Internet, it will be liable
notwithstanding the fact that it did not post or edit the content. In China, an ISP will be
subject to liability if it merely quotes the defamatory statements of another.20 Countries
such as China and Singapore can be said to be at the extreme opposite side to that of the
American law. Both positions seem to be problematic. There must be a balance between
the interests of the ISPs and those who are injured by the content that is posted in the
electronic bulletin boards which are hosted by these ISPs. French privacy law has been
viewed by some lawyers as an appropriate way to strike a balance between one
individual’s right to speak freely on the Internet and another person’s right to personal
dignity.
This does not mean that victims of internet libel or defamation do not have any
recourse. They may elect to sue the third-party user who generated the defamatory
statements. The plaintiff can issue the internet service provider with a subpoena
requesting the service provider to release the identity of the author of a defamatory
comment. What normally happens is that before the provider of an interactive service
releases the identity, they contact the author of the defamatory comments to inform him
20

See, Maxstation v. Wang Hong, Life Times & PC World, Case No. 1438 (Beijing No. 1 Interm. People’s
Court., 2000) (where two Internet magazines who directly quoted Wang Hong’s speech that a
corporation’s product was “as soft as tofu” were held liable for defamation).
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about the subpoena so that he can oppose the release of his identity by the service
provider. As has been the trend, the authors of defamatory comments legally fight for
their identities not to be unmasked.
This has proved to be one of the greatest challenges faced by the victims of defamatory
statements posted on the internet because, as noted at the beginning of this paper, on the one
hand internet speech is mostly anonymous and on the other hand courts are reluctant to unmask
the identities of the authors of the defamatory postings. In the United States of America, courts
have reiterated that internet speakers have a right to speak anonymously.21 Although United
States Courts have to balance the defendant’s right to speak anonymously on the internet and the
plaintiff’s right to protect his reputation, they are unwilling to unmask the identities of the
speakers especially where the plaintiff is a public figure. The justification for this reluctance is
based on the fact that plaintiffs may lose the libel suit against the defendant and still pursue them
extra-judicially by seeking revenge or retribution. In John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill,22 the court
explained the reasons why it was unwilling to unmask the identity of the defendant and said,
“This ‘sue first, ask questions later’ approach, coupled with a standard only minimally protective
of the anonymity of the defendants, will discourage debate on important issues of public concern
as more and more anonymous posters censor their online statements in response to the likelihood
of being unmasked.” 23 In In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America On Line24, the Virginia trial
court held that the court should order a non-party internet service provider to release the identity

21

22

See, John Doe No. 1 v Patrick and Julia Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).

23

Id at 461

24

2000 WL 1210372, 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001)
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of the author of the defamatory statement(s) only “ (1) when the court is satisfied by the
pleadings or evidence supplied to that court (2) that the party requesting the subpoena has a
legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of actionable conduct and (3) the
subpoenaed identity information is centrally needed to advance that claim.”25
The above stricter standard of approach that the United States courts have adopted is
evident of the courts’ reluctance in allowing the identity of the authors of defamatory statements
to be unmasked.

CONCLUSION
Since libel on the Internet has been an international problem for a quite some time, the
international community should seriously consider a uniform, international methodology in
handling libel suits. The problems currently being experienced by those libeled on the Internet
will be eradicated. An international approach will bring to an end the dilemma of forum
shopping and the United Kingdom will no longer be a “libel tourist destination”. A uniform
methodology is the most realistic solution to the problem of reluctance by countries to enforce
foreign judgments.
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Id at 8
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